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Abstract
Powerful adversarial attack methods are vital for
understanding how to construct robust deep neural
networks (DNNs) and thoroughly testing defense
techniques. In this paper, we propose a black-box
adversarial attack algorithm that can defeat both
vanilla DNNs and those generated by various de-
fense techniques developed recently. Instead of
searching for an “optimal” adversarial example
for a benign input to a targeted DNN, our algo-
rithm finds a probability density distribution over
a small region centered around the input, such that
a sample drawn from this distribution is likely an
adversarial example, without the need of access-
ing the DNN’s internal layers or weights. Our
approach is universal as it can successfully attack
different neural networks by a single algorithm.
It is also strong; according to the testing against
2 vanilla DNNs and 13 defended ones, it out-
performs state-of-the-art black-box or white-box
attack methods for most test cases. Additionally,
our results reveal that adversarial training remains
one of the best defense techniques, and the ad-
versarial examples are not as transferable across
defended DNNs as them across vanilla DNNs.
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the robustness of deep neural
networks (DNNs). We aim at providing a strong adversarial
attack method that can universally defeat a variety of DNNs
and associated defense techniques. Our experiments mainly
focus on attacking the recently developed defense methods,
following (Athalye et al., 2018). Unlike their work, however,
we do not need to tailor our algorithm to various forms for
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tackling different defenses. Hence, it may generalize better
to new defense methods in the future. Progress on powerful
adversarial attack algorithms will significantly facilitate the
research toward more robust DNNs that are deployed in
uncertain or even adversarial environments.
Szegedy et al. (2013) found that DNNs are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples whose changes from the benign ones are
imperceptible and yet can mislead DNNs to make wrong pre-
dictions. A rich line of work furthering their finding reveals
more worrisome results. Notably, adversarial examples are
transferable, meaning that one can design adversarial exam-
ples for one DNN and then use them to fail others (Papernot
et al., 2016a; Szegedy et al., 2013; Trame`r et al., 2017b).
Moreover, adversarial perturbation could be universal in the
sense that a single perturbation pattern may convert many
images to adversarial ones (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017).
The adversarial examples raise a serious security issue as
DNNs become increasingly popular (Silver et al., 2016;
Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Hinton et al., 2012; Li et al., 2018;
Gan et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the cause of the adversar-
ial examples remains unclear. Goodfellow et al. (2014b)
conjectured that DNNs behave linearly in the high dimen-
sional input space, amplifying small perturbations when
their signs follow the DNNs’ intrinsic linear weights. Fawzi
et al. (2018) experimentally studied the topology and geom-
etry of adversarial examples and Xu et al. (2019) provide
the image-level interpretability of adversarial examples. Ma
et al. (2018) characterized the subspace of adversarial ex-
amples. Nonetheless, defense methods (Papernot et al.,
2015; Trame`r et al., 2017a; Rozsa et al., 2016; Madry et al.,
2018) motivated by them were broken in a short amount of
time (He et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2017;
Sharma & Chen, 2017), indicating that better defense tech-
niques are yet to be developed, and there may be unknown
alternative factors that play a role in the DNNs’ sensitivity.
Powerful adversarial attack methods are key to better un-
derstanding of the adversarial examples and for thorough
testing of defense techniques.
In this paper, we propose a black-box adversarial attack
algorithm that can generate adversarial examples to defeat
both vanilla DNNs and those recently defended by various
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techniques. Given an arbitrary input to a DNN, our algo-
rithm finds a probability density over a small region centered
around the input such that a sample drawn from this density
distribution is likely an adversarial example, without the
need of accessing the DNN’s internal layers or weights —
thus, our method falls into the realm of black-box adversar-
ial attack (Papernot et al., 2017; Brendel et al., 2017; Chen
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018).
Our approach is strong; tested against two vanilla DNNs
and 13 defended ones, it outperforms state-of-the-art black-
box or white-box attack methods for most cases, and it
is on par with them for the remaining cases. It is also
universal as it attacks various DNNs by a single algo-
rithm. We hope it can effectively benchmark new de-
fense methods in the future — code is available at https:
//github.com/Cold-Winter/Nattack. Additionally,
our study reveals that adversarial training remains one of the
best defenses (Madry et al., 2018), and the adversarial exam-
ples are not as transferable across defended DNNs as them
across vanilla ones. The latter somehow weakens the prac-
tical significance of white-box methods which otherwise
could fail a black-box DNN by attacking a substitute.
Our optimization criterion is motivated by the natural evolu-
tion strategy (NES) (Wierstra et al., 2008). NES has been
previously employed by Ilyas et al. (2018) to estimate the
gradients in the projected gradient search for adversarial
examples. However, their algorithm leads to inferior per-
formance to what we proposed (cf. Table 1). This is prob-
ably because, in their approach, the gradients have to be
estimated relatively accurately for the projected gradient
method to be effective. However, some of the neural net-
works F (x) are not smooth, so that the NES estimation of
the gradient ∇F (x) is not reliable enough.
In this paper, we opt for a different methodology using
a constrained NES formulation as the objective function
instead of using NES to estimate gradients as in Ilyas et al.
(2018). The main idea is to smooth the loss function by
a probability density distribution defined over the `p-ball
centered around a benign input to the neural network. All
adversarial examples of this input belong to this ball1. In
this frame, assuming that we can find a distribution such that
the loss is small, then a sample drawn from the distribution
is likely adversarial. Notably, this formulation does not
depend on estimating the gradient∇F (x) any more, so it is
not impeded by the non-smoothness of DNNs.
We adopt parametric distributions in this work. The initial-
ization to the distribution parameters plays a key role in the
run time of our algorithm. In order to swiftly find a good
initial distribution to start from, we train a regression neural
1It is straightforward to extend our method to other constraints
bounding the offsets between inputs and adversarial examples.
network such that it takes as input the input to the target
DNN to be attacked and its output parameterizes a probabil-
ity density as the initialization to our main algorithm.
Our approach is advantageous over existing ones in multi-
ple folds. First, we can designate the distribution in a low-
dimensional parameter space while the adversarial examples
are often high-dimensional. Second, instead of questing an
“optimal” adversarial example, we can virtually draw an
infinite number of adversarial examples from the distribu-
tion. Finally, the distribution may speed up the adversarial
training for improving DNNs’ robustness because it is more
efficient to sample many adversarial examples from a distri-
bution than to find them using gradient based optimization.
2. Approach
Consider a DNN classifier C(x) = argmaxi F (x)i, where
x ∈ [0, 1]dim(x) is an input to the neural network F (·). We
assume softmax is employed for the output layer of the net-
work and let F (·)i denote the i-th dimension of the softmax
output. When this DNN correctly classifies the input, i.e.,
C(x) = y, where y is the groundtruth label of the input x,
our objective is to find an adversarial example xadv for x
such that they are imperceptibly close and yet the DNN clas-
sifier labels them distinctly; in other words, C(xadv) 6= y.
We exclude the inputs for which the DNN classifier pre-
dicts wrong labels in this work, following the convention of
previous work (Carlini & Wagner, 2017).
We bound the `p distance between an input x and its adver-
sarial counterparts: xadv ∈ Sp(x) := {x′ : ‖x − x′‖p ≤
τp}, p = 2 or∞. We omit from Sp(x) the argument (x)
and the subscript p when it does not cause ambiguity. Let
projS(x
′) denote the projection of x′ ∈ Rdim(x) onto S.
We first review the NES based black-box adversarial attack
method (Ilyas et al., 2018). We show that its performance is
impeded by unstable estimation of the gradients of certain
DNNs, followed by our approach which does not depend at
all on the gradients of the DNNs.
2.1. A Black-box Adversarial Attack by NES
Ilyas et al. (2018) proposed to search for an optimal adver-
sarial example in the following sense,
xadv ← arg min
x′∈S
f(x′), (1)
given a benign input x and its label y correctly predicted
by the neural network F (·), where S is a small region con-
taining x defined above, and f(x′) is a loss function defined
as f(x′) := −F (x′)y. In (Ilyas et al., 2018), this loss is
minimized by the projected gradient method,
xt+1 ← projS(xt − η sign(∇f(xt))), (2)
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where sign(·) is a sign function. The main challenge here
is how to estimate the gradient ∇f(xt) with derivative-
free methods, as the network’s internal architecture and
weights are unknown in the black-box adversarial attack.
One technique for doing so is by NES (Wierstra et al., 2008):
∇f(xt) ≈ ∇xtEN (z|xt,σ2)f(z) (3)
= EN (z|xt,σ2)f(z)∇xt logN (z|xt, σ2), (4)
where N (z|xt, σ2) is an isometric normal distribution with
mean xt and variance σ2. Therefore, the stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) version of eq. (2) becomes:
xt+1 ← projS
(
xt − η sign
(1
b
b∑
i=1
f(zi)∇ logN (zi|xt, σ2)
))
,
where b is the size of a mini-batch and zi is sampled from
the normal distribution. The performance of this approach
hinges on the quality of the estimated gradient. Our ex-
periments show that its performance varies on attacking
different DNNs probably because non-smooth DNNs lead
to unstable NES estimation of the gradients (cf. eq. (3)).
2.2. NATTACK
We propose a different formulation albeit still motivated by
NES. Given an input x and a small region S that contains x
(i.e., S = Sp(x) defined earlier), the key idea is to consider
a smoothed objective as our optimization criterion:
min
θ
J(θ) :=
∫
f(x′)piS(x′|θ)dx′ (5)
where piS(x′|θ) is a probability density with support defined
on S. Compared with problem (1), this frame assumes that
we can find a distribution over S such that the loss f(x′)
is small in expectation. Hence, a sample drawn from this
distribution is likely adversarial. Furthermore, with appro-
priate piS(·|θ), the objective J(θ) is a smooth function of θ,
and the optimization process of this formulation does not de-
pend on any estimation of the gradient∇f(xt). Therefore,
it is not impeded by the non-smoothness of neural networks.
Finally, the distribution over S can be parameterized in a
much lower dimensional space (dim(θ) dim(x)), giving
rise to more efficient algorithms than eq. (2) which directly
works in the high-dimensional input space.
2.2.1. THE DISTRIBUTION ON S
In order to define a distribution piS(x′|θ) on S, we take the
following transformation of variable approach:
x′ = projS(g(z)), z ∼ N (z|µ, σ2) (6)
whereN (z|µ, σ2) is an isometric normal distribution whose
mean µ and variance σ2 are to be learned and the function
g : Rdim(µ) 7→ Rdim(x) maps a normal instance to the space
of the neural network input. We leave it to future work to
explore the other types of distributions.
In this work, we implement the transformation of the normal
variable by the following steps:
1. draw z ∼ N (µ, σ2), compute g(z) as
g(z) = 1/2(tanh(g0(z)) + 1),
2. clip δ′ = clipp(g(z)− x), p = 2 or∞, and
3. return projS(g(z)) as x
′ = x+ δ′
Step 1 draws a “seed” z and then maps it by g0(z) to the
space of the same dimension as the input x. In our ex-
periments, we let z lie in the space of the CIFAR10 im-
ages (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) (i.e., R32×32×3), so the
function g0(·) is an identity mapping for the experiments on
CIFAR10 and a bilinear interpolation for the ImageNet im-
ages (Deng et al., 2009). We further transform g0(z) to the
same range as the input by g(z) = 12 (tanh (g0(z)) + 1) ∈
[0, 1]dim(x) and then compute the offset δ = g(z) − x be-
tween the transformed vector and the input. Steps 2 and
3 detail how to project g(z) onto the set S, where the clip
functions are respectively
clip2(δ) =
{
δτ2/‖δ‖2 if ‖δ‖2 > τ2
δ else (7)
clip∞(δ) = min(δ, τ∞) (8)
with the thresholds τ2 and τ∞ given by users.
Thus far, we have fully specified our problem formulation
(eq. (5)). Before discussing how to solve this problem, we
recall that the set S is the `p-ball centered at x: S = Sp(x).
Since problem (5) is formulated for a particular input to the
targeted DNN, the input x also determines the distribution
piS(z|θ) via the dependency of S on x. In other words, we
will learn personalized distributions for different inputs.
2.2.2. OPTIMIZATION
Let projS(g(z)) be steps 1–3 in the above variable transfor-
mation procedure. We can rewrite the objective function
J(θ) in problem (5) as
J(θ) = EN (z|µ,σ)f(proj(g(z))),
where θ = (µ, σ2) are the unknowns. We use grid search to
find a proper bandwidth σ for the normal distribution and
NES to find its mean µ:
µt+1 ← µt − η∇µJ(θ)|µt , (9)
NATTACK: Learning the Distributions of Adversarial Examples for an Improved Black-Box Attack on Deep Neural Networks
whose SGD version over a mini-batch of size b is
µt+1 ← µt − η
b
b∑
i=1
f(projS(g(zi)))∇µ logN (zi|µt, σ2).
In practice, we sample i from a standard normal distribution
and then use a linear transformation zi = µ+ iσ to make
it follow the distribution N (z|µ, σ2). With this notion, we
can simplify ∇µ logN (zi|µt, σ2) ∝ σ−1i.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the full algorithm, called
NATTACK, for optimizing our smoothed formulation in
eq. (5). In line 6 of Algorithm 1, the z-score operation
is to subtract from each loss quantity fi the mean of the
losses f1, · · · , fb and divide it by the standard deviation
of all the loss quantities. We find it stablizes NATTACK;
the algorithm converges well with a constant learning rate
η. Otherwise, one would have to schedule more sophis-
ticated learning rates as reported in (Ilyas et al., 2018).
Regarding the loss function in line 5, we employ the
C&W loss (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) in the experiments:
f(x′) := max
(
0, logF (x′)y −maxc6=y logF (x′)c
)
.
In order to generate an adversarial example for an input x to
the neural network classifier C(·), we use theNATTACK al-
gorithm to find a probability density distribution over Sp(x)
and then sample from this distribution until arriving at an
adversarial instance x′ such that C(x′) 6= C(x).
Note that our method differs from that of Ilyas et al. (2018)
in that we allow an arbitrary data transformation g(·) which
is more flexible than directly seeking the adversarial exam-
ple in the input space, and we absorb the computation of
projS(·) into the function evaluation before the update of µ
(line 7 of Algorithm 1). On the contrary, the projection of
Ilyas et al. (2018) is after the computation of the estimated
gradient (which is similar to line 7 in Algorithm 1) because
it is an estimation of the projected gradient. The difference
in the computational order of projection is conceptually im-
portant because, in our case, the projection is treated as part
of the function evaluation, which is more stable than treating
it as an estimation of the projected gradient. Practically, this
also makes a major difference, which can be seen from our
experimental comparisons of the two approaches.
2.3. Initializing NATTACK by Regression
The initialization to the mean µ0 in Algorithm 1 plays a
key role in terms of run time. When a good initialization
is given, we often successfully find adversarial examples
in less than 100 iterations. Hence, we propose to boost the
NATTACK algorithm by using a regression neural network.
It takes a benign example x as the input and outputs µ0 to
initializeNATTACK. In order to train this regressor, we gen-
erate many (input, adversarial example) pairs {(x, xadv)}
by running NATTACK on the training set of benchmark
Algorithm 1 Black-box adversarial NATTACK
Input: DNN F (·), input x and its label y, initial mean µ0,
standard deviation σ, learning rate η, sample size b, and the
maximum number of iterations T
Output: µT , mean of the normal distribution
1: for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 do
2: Sample 1,...,b ∼ N (0, I)
3: Compute gi = g(µt+iσ) by Step 1 ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , b}
4: Obtain proj(gi) by steps 2–3, ∀i
5: Compute losses fi := f(proj(gi)),∀i
6: Z-score f̂i = (fi −mean(f))/std(f),∀i
7: Set µt+1 ← µt − ηbσ
∑b
i=1 f̂ii
8: end for
datasets. The regression network’s weights are then set by
minimizing the `2 loss between the network’s output and
g−10 (arctan(2xadv − 1))− g−10 (arctan(2x− 1)); in other
words, we regress for the offset between the adversarial
example xadv and the input x in the space Rdim(µ) of the dis-
tribution parameters. The supplementary materials present
more details about this regression network.
3. Experiments
We use the proposed NATTACK to attack 13 defense meth-
ods for DNNs published in 2018 or 2019 and two repre-
sentative vanilla DNNs. For each defense method, we run
experiments using the same protocol as reported in the origi-
nal paper, including the datasets and `p distance (along with
the threshold) to bound the differences between adversarial
examples and inputs — this experiment protocol favors the
defense method. In particular, CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky &
Hinton, 2009) is employed in the attack on nine defense
methods and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) is used for the
remaining four. We examine all the test images of CIFAR10
and randomly choose 1,000 images from the test set of
ImageNet. 12 of the defenses concern the `∞ distance be-
tween the adversarial examples and the benign ones and one
works with the `2 distance. We threshold the l∞ distance
in the normalized [0, 1]dim(x) input space. The l2 distance is
normalized by the number of pixels.
In addition to the main comparison results, we also inves-
tigate the defense methods’ robustness versus the varying
strengths of NATTACK (cf. Section 3.2). Specifically, we
plot the attack success rate versus the attack iteration. The
curves provide a complementary metric to the overall attack
success rate, uncovering the dynamic traits of the competi-
tion between a defense and an attack.
Finally, we examine the adversarial examples’ transferabil-
ities between some of the defended neural networks (cf.
Section 3.3). Results show that, unlike the finding that
many adversarial examples are transferable across different
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vanilla neural networks, a majority of the adversarial exam-
ples that fail one defended DNN cannot defeat the others. In
some sense, this weakens the practical significance of white-
box attack methods which are often thought applicable to
unknown DNN classifiers by attacking a substitute neural
network instead (Papernot et al., 2017).
3.1. Attacking 13 Most Recent Defense Techniques
We consider 13 defenses recently developed: adversarial
training (ADV-TRAIN) (Madry et al., 2018), adversarial
training of Bayesian DNNs (ADV-BNN) (Liu et al., 2019),
Thermometer encoding (THERM) (Buckman et al., 2018),
THERM-ADV (Athalye et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018),
ADV-GAN (Wang & Yu, 2019), local intrinsic dimension-
ality (LID) (Ma et al., 2018), stochastic activation prun-
ing (SAP) (Dhillon et al., 2018), random self-ensemble
(RSE) (Liu et al., 2018), cascade adversarial training (CAS-
ADV) (Na et al., 2018), randomization (Xie et al., 2018), in-
put transformation (INPUT-TRANS) (Guo et al., 2018), pixel
deflection (Prakash et al., 2018), and guided denoiser (Liao
et al., 2018). We describe them in detail in the supplemen-
tary materials. Additionally, we also include Wide Resnet-
32 (WRESNET-32) (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) and
INCEPTION V3 (Szegedy et al., 2016), two vanilla neural
networks for CIFAR10 and ImageNet, respectively.
Implementation Details. In our experiments, the defended
DNNs of SAP, LID, RANDOMIZATION, INPUT-TRANS,
THERM, and THERM-DAV come from (Athalye et al., 2018),
the defended models of GUIDED DENOISER and PIXEL
DEFLECTION are based on (Athalye & Carlini, 2018), and
the models defended by RSE, CAS-ADV, ADV-TRAIN, and
ADV-GAN are respectively from the original papers. For
ADV-BNN, we attack an ensemble of ten BNN models.
In all our experiments, we set T = 600 as the maximum
number of optimization iterations, b = 300 for the sample
size, variance of the isotropic Gaussian σ2 = 0.01, and
learning rate η = 0.008. NATTACK is able to defeat most
of the defenses under this setting and about 90% inputs
for other cases. We then fine-tune the learning rate η and
sample size b for the hard leftovers.
3.1.1. ATTACK SUCCESS RATES
We report in Table 1 the main comparison results evalu-
ated by the attack success rate, the higher the better. Our
NATTACK achieves 100% success on six out of the 13 de-
fenses and more than 90% on five of the rest. As a single
black-box adversarial algorithm, NATTACK is better than
or on par with the set of powerful white-box attack meth-
ods of various forms (Athalye et al., 2018), especially on
the defended DNNs. It also significantly outperforms three
state-of-the-art black-box attack methods: ZOO (Chen et al.,
2017), which adopts the zero-th order gradients to find ad-
versarial examples; QL (Ilyas et al., 2018), a query-limited
attack based on an evolution strategy; and a decision-based
(D-based) attack method (Brendel et al., 2017) mainly gen-
erating `2-bounded adversarial examples.
Notably, ADV-TRAIN is still among the best defense meth-
ods, so is its extension to the Bayesian DNNs (i.e., ADV-
BNN). However, along with CAS-ADV and THERM-ADV
which are also equipped with the adversarial training, their
strengths come at the price that they give worse classifica-
tion performances than the others on the clean inputs (cf.
the third column of Table 1). Moreover, ADV-TRAIN incurs
extremely high computation cost. When the image resolu-
tions are high, Kurakin et al. (2016) found that it is difficult
to run the adversarial training at the ImageNet scale. Since
our NATTACK enables efficient generation of adversarial
examples once we learn the distribution, we can potentially
scale up the adversarial training with NATTACK and will
explore it in the future work.
We have tuned the main free parameters of the competing
methods (e.g., batch size and bandwidth in QL). ZOO runs
extremely slow with high-resolution images, so we instead
use the hierarchical trick the authors described (Chen et al.,
2017) for the experiments on ImageNet. In particular, we
run ZOO starting from the attack space of 32 × 32 × 3,
lift the resolution to 64× 64× 3 after 2,000 iterations and
then to 128 × 128 × 3 after 10,000 iterations, and finally
up-sample the result to the same size as the DNN input with
bilinear interpolation.
3.1.2. ABLATION STUDY AND RUN-TIME COMPARISON
NATTACK vs. QL. We have discussed the conceptual dif-
ferences between NATTACK and QL (Ilyas et al., 2018) in
Section 2 (e.g., NATTACK formulates a smooth optimiza-
tion criterion and offers a probability density on the `p-ball
of an input). Moreover, the comparison results in Table 1
verify the advantage of NATTACK over QL in terms of
the overall attack strengths. Additionally, we here conduct
an ablation study to investigate two major algorithmic dif-
ferences between them: NATTACK absorbs the projection
(projS) into the objective function and allows an arbitrary
change of variable transformation g(·). Our study concerns
THERM-ADV and SAP, two defended DNNs on which QL
respectively reaches 42.3% and 96.2% attack success rates.
After we instead absorb the projection in QL into the objec-
tive, the results are improved to 54.7% and 97.7%, respec-
tively. If we further apply g(·), the change of variable pro-
cedure (cf. Steps 1–3), the success rates become 83.3% and
98.9%, respectively. Finally, with the z-score operation (line
6 of Algorithm 1), the results are boosted to 90.9%/100%,
approaching NATTACK’s 91.2%/100%. Therefore, we say
thatNATTACK boosts QL’s performance, thanks to both the
smoothed objective and the transformation g(·).
NATTACK vs. the White-Box BPDA Attack. While
BPDA achieves high attack success rates by different vari-
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Table 1. Adversarial attack on 13 recently published defense methods. (* the number reported in (Athalye et al., 2018). For all the other
numbers, we obtain them by running the code released by the authors or implemented ourselves with the help of the authors. For D-based
and ADV-TRAIN, we respectively report the results on 100 and 1000 images only because they incur expensive computation costs.)
Defense Technique Dataset Classification Threshold Attack Success Rate %Accuracy % & Distance BPDA ZOO QL D-based NATTACK
ADV-TRAIN CIFAR10 87.3 0.031 (L∞) 46.9 16.9 40.3 – 47.9(Madry et al., 2018)
ADV-BNN CIFAR10 79.7 0.035 (L∞) 48.3 – – – 75.3(Liu et al., 2019)
THERM-ADV CIFAR10 88.5 0.031 (L∞) 76.1 0.0 42.3 – 91.2(Athalye et al., 2018)
CAS-ADV CIFAR10 75.6 0.015 (L∞) 85.0* 96.1 68.4 – 97.7(Na et al., 2018)
ADV-GAN CIFAR10 90.9 0.031 (L∞) 48.9 76.4 53.7 – 98.3(Wang & Yu, 2019)
LID CIFAR10 66.9 0.031 (L∞) 95.0 92.9 95.7 – 100.0(Ma et al., 2018)
THERM CIFAR10 92.8 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 0.0 96.5 – 100.0(Buckman et al., 2018)
SAP CIFAR10 93.3 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 5.9 96.2 – 100.0(Dhillon et al., 2018)
RSE CIFAR10 91.4 0.031 (L∞) – – – – 100.0(Liu et al., 2018)
VANILLA WRESNET-32 CIFAR10 95.0 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 99.3 96.8 – 100.0(Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016)
GUIDED DENOISER ImageNet 79.1 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 – – – 95.5(Liao et al., 2018)
RANDOMIZATION ImageNet 77.8 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 6.7 45.9 – 96.5(Xie et al., 2018)
INPUT-TRANS ImageNet 77.6 0.05 (L2) 100.0 38.3 66.5 66.0 100.0(Guo et al., 2018)
PIXEL DEFLECTION ImageNet 69.1 0.015 (L∞) 97.0 – 8.5 – 100.0(Prakash et al., 2018)
VANILLA INCEPTION V3 ImageNet 78.0 0.031 (L∞) 100.0 62.1 100.0 – 100.0(Szegedy et al., 2016)
ants for handling the diverse defense techniques,NATTACK
gives rise to better or comparable results by a single uni-
versal algorithm. Additionally, we compare them in terms
of the run time in the supplementary materials; the main
observations are the following. On CIFAR10, BPDA and
NATTACK can both find an adversarial example in about
30s. To defeat an ImageNet image, it takes NATTACK
about 71s without the regression network and 48s when it
is equipped with the regression net; in contrast, BPDA only
needs 4s. It is surprising to see that BPDA is almost 7 times
faster at attacking a DNN for ImageNet than a DNN for
CIFAR10. It is probably because the gradients of the former
are not “obfuscated” as well as the latter due to the higher
resolution of the ImageNet input.
3.2. Attack Success Rate vs. Attack Iteration
The NATTACK algorithm has an appealing property as fol-
lows. In expectation, the loss (eq. (5)) decreases at every
iteration and hence a sample drawn from the distribution
piS(x|θ) is adversarial with higher chance. Though there
could be oscillations, we find that the attack strengths do
grow monotonically with respect to the evolution iterations
in our experiments. Hence, we propose a new curve shown
in Figure 1a featuring the attack success rate versus num-
ber of evolution iterations — strength of attack. For the
experiment here, the Gaussian mean µ0 is initialized by
µ0 ∼ N (g−10 (arctan(2x−1)), σ2) for any input x to main-
tain about the same starting points for all the curves.
Figure 1a plots eight defense methods on CIFAR10 along
with a vanilla DNN. It is clear that ADV-TRAIN, ADV-
BNN, THERM-ADV, and CAS-ADV, which all employ the
adversarial training strategy, are more difficult to attack than
the others. What’s more interesting is with the other five
DNNs. AlthoughNATTACK completely defeats them all by
the end, the curve of the vanilla DNN is the steepest while
the SAP curve rises much slower. If there are constraints
on the computation time or the number of queries to the
DNN classifiers, SAP is advantageous over the vanilla DNN,
RSE, THERM, and LID.
Note that the ranking of the defenses in Table 1 (evaluation
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Figure 1. (a) Success rate versus run steps of NATTACK. (b) Comparison results with QL measured by the log of average number of
queries per successful image. The solid lines denoteNATTACK and the dashed lines illustrate QL.
by the success rate) is different from the ordering on the
left half of Figure 1a, signifying the attack success rate and
the curve mutually complement. The curve reveals more
characteristics of the defense methods especially when there
are constraints on the computation time or number of queries
to the DNN classifier.
Figure 1b shows NATTACK (solid lines) is more query
efficient than the QL attack (Ilyas et al., 2018) (dashed
lines) on 6 defenses under most attack success rates and the
difference is even amplified for higher success rates. For
SAP, NATTACK performs better when the desired attack
success rate is bigger than 80%.
3.3. Transferability
We also study the transferability of adversarial examples
across different defended DNNs. This study differs from
the earlier ones on vanilla DNNs (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Liu et al., 2016). We investigate both the white-box attack
BPDA and our black-box NATTACK.
Following the experiment setup in (Kurakin et al., 2016),
we randomly select 1000 images for each targeted DNN
such that they are classified correctly, and yet the adversar-
ial images of them are classified incorrectly. We then use
the adversarial examples of the 1000 images to attack the
other DNNs. In addition to the defended DNNs, we also
include two vanilla DNNs for reference: VANILLA-1 and
VANILLA-2. VANILLA-1 is a light-weight DNN classifier
built by (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) with 80% accuracy on CI-
FAR10. VANILLA-2 is the Wide-ResNet-28 (Zagoruyko &
Komodakis, 2016) which gives rise to 92.3% classification
accuracy on CIFAR10. For fair comparison, we change the
threshold τ∞ to 0.031 for CAS-ADV. We exclude RSE and
CAS-ADV from BPDA’s confusion table because it is not
obviously clear how to attack RSE using BPDA and the re-
leased BPDA code lacks the piece for attacking CAS-ADV.
The confusion tables of BPDA and NATTACK are shown
in Figure 2, respectively, where each entry indicates the
success rate of using the adversarial examples originally
targeting the row-wise defense model to attack the column-
wise defense. Both confusion tables are asymmetric; it is
easier to transfer from defended models to the vanilla DNNs
than vice versa. Besides, the overall transferrability is lower
than that across the DNNs without any defenses (Liu et al.,
2016). We highlight some additional observations below.
Firstly, the transferability of our black-box NATTACK is
not as good as the black-box BPDA attack. This is probably
because BPDA is able to explore the intrinsically common
part of the DNN classifiers — it has the privilege of access-
ing the true or estimated gradients that observe the DNNs’
architectures and weights.
Secondly, both the network architecture and defense meth-
ods can influence the transferability. VANILLA-2 is the
underlying classifier of SAP, THERM-ADV, and THERM.
The adversarial examples originally attacking VANILLA-
2 do transfer better to SAP and THERM than to the others
probably because they share the same DNN architecture, but
the examples achieve very low success rate on THERM-ADV
due to the defense technique.
Finally, the transfer success rates are low no matter from
THERM-ADV to the other defenses or vice versa, and ADV-
TRAIN and ADV-BNN lead to fairly good results of transfer
attacks on the other defenses and yet themselves are ro-
bust against the adversarial examples of the other defended
DNNs. The unique result of THERM-ADV probably at-
tributes to its use of double defense techniques, i.e., Ther-
mometer encoding and adversarial training.
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Figure 2. Transferabilities of BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018) (left) and NATTACK (right). Each entry shows the attack success rate of
attacking the column-wise defense by the adversarial examples that are originally generated for the row-wise DNN.
4. Related Work
There is a vast literature of adversarial attacks on and de-
fenses for DNNs. We focus on the most related works in
this section rather than a thorough survey.
White-Box Attacks. The adversary has full access to the
target DNN in the white-box attack. Szegedy et al. (2013)
first find that DNNs are fragile to the adversarial exam-
ples by using box-constrained L-BFGS. Goodfellow et al.
(2014a) propose a fast gradient sign (FGS) method, which
is featured by efficiency and high performance for generat-
ing the `∞ bounded adversarial examples. Papernot et al.
(2016b) and Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2016) instead formu-
late the problems with the l0 and `2 metrics, respectively.
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017) have proposed a powerful iterative
optimization based attack. Similarly, a projected gradient
descent has been shown strong in attacking DNNs (Madry
et al., 2018). Most the white-box attacks rely on the gra-
dients of the DNNs. When the gradients are “obfuscated”
(e.g., by randomization), (Athalye et al., 2018) derive vari-
ous methods to approximate the gradients, while we use a
single algorithm to attack a variety of defended DNNs.
Black-Box Attacks. As the name suggests, some parts
of the DNNs are treated as black boxes in the black-box
attack. Thanks to the adversarial examples’ transferabili-
ties (Szegedy et al., 2013), Papernot et al. (2017) train a
substitute DNN to imitate the target black-box DNN, pro-
duce adversarial examples of the substitute model, and then
use them to attack the target DNN. Chen et al. (2017) in-
stead use the zero-th order optimization to find adversarial
examples. Ilyas et al. (2018) use the evolution strategy (Sal-
imans et al., 2017) to approximate the gradients. Brendel
et al. (2017) introduce a decision-based attack by reading
the hard labels predicted by a DNN, rather than the soft
probabilistic output. Similarly, Cheng et al. (2019) also
provide a formulation to explore the hard labels. Most of
the existing black-box methods are tested against vanilla
DNNs. In this work, we test them on defended ones along
with our NATTACK.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present a black-box adversarial attack
method which learns a probability density on the `p-ball of
a clean input to the targeted neural network. One of the ma-
jor advantages of our approach is that it allows an arbitrary
transformation of variable g(·), converting the adversarial
attack to a space of much lower dimensional than the in-
put space. Experiments show that our algorithm defeats 13
defended DNNs, better than or on par with state-of-the-art
white-box attack methods. Additionally, our experiments
on the transferability of the adversarial examples across the
defended DNNs show different results reported in the litera-
ture: unlike the high transferability across vanilla DNNs, it
is difficult to transfer the attacks on the defended DNNs.
Some existing works try to characterize the adversarial ex-
amples by their geometric properties. In contrast to this
macro view, we model the adversarial population of each
single input from a micro view by a probabilistic density.
There are still a lot to explore along this avenue. What is
a good family of distributions to model the adversarial ex-
amples? How to conduct adversarial training by efficiently
sampling from the distribution? These questions are worth
further investigation in the future work.
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Supplementary Materials for NATTACK: Learning the Distributions of
Adversarial Examples for an Improved Black-Box Attack on Deep Neural
Networks
In this supplementary document, we provide the following
details to support the main text:
Section A: descriptions of the 13 defense methods studied
in the experiments,
Section B: architecture of the regression neural network
for initializing our NATTACK algorithm, and
Section C: run-time analysis about NATTACK and
BPDA (Athalye et al., 2018).
A. More Details of the 13 Defense Methods
• Thermometer encoding (THERM). To break the hy-
pothesized linearity behavior of DNNs (Goodfellow et al.,
2014a), Buckman et al. (2018) proposed to transform the
input by non-differentiable and non-linear thermometer
encoding, followed by a slight change to the input layer
of conventional DNNs.
• ADV-TRAIN & THERM-ADV. Madry et al. (2018) pro-
posed a defense using adversarial training (ADV-TRAIN).
Specially, the training procedure alternates between seek-
ing an “optimal” adversarial example for each input by
projected gradient descent (PGD) and minimizing the
classification loss under the PGD attack. Furthermore,
Athalye et al. (2018) find that the adversarial robust train-
ing (Madry et al., 2018) can significantly improve the
defense strength of THERM (THERM-ADV). Compared
with ADV-TRAIN, the adversarial examples are produced
by the logit-space projected gradient ascent in the train-
ing.
• Cascade adversarial training (CAS-ADV). Na et al.
(2018) reduced the computation cost of the adversarial
training (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin et al., 2016)
in a cascade manner. A model is trained from the clean
data and one-step adversarial examples first. The second
model is trained from the original data, one-step adver-
sarial examples, as well as iterative adversarial examples
generated against the first model. Additionally, a regu-
larization is introduced to the unified embeddings of the
clean and adversarial examples.
• Adversarially trained Bayesian neural network
(ADV-BNN). Liu et al. (2019) proposed to model the
randomness added to DNNs in a Bayesian framework in
order to defend against adversarial attack. Besides, they
incorporated the adversarial training, which has been
shown effective in the previous works, into the frame-
work.
• Adversarial training with adversarial examples gen-
erated from GAN (ADV-GAN). Wang & Yu (2019)
proposed to model the adversarial perturbation with a
generative network, and they learned it jointly with the
defensive DNN as a discriminator.
• Stochastic activation pruning (SAP). Dhillon et al.
(2018) randomly dropped some neurons of each layer
with the probabilities in proportion to their absolute val-
ues.
• RANDOMIZATION. (Xie et al., 2018) added a random-
ization layer between inputs and a DNN classifier. This
layer consists of resizing an image to a random resolution,
zero-padding, and randomly selecting one from many re-
sulting images as the actual input to the classifier.
• Input transformation (INPUT-TRANS). By a similar
idea as above, Guo et al. (2018) explored several combi-
nations of input transformations coupled with adversarial
training, such as image cropping and rescaling, bit-depth
reduction, JPEG compression.
• PIXEL DEFLECTION. Prakash et al. (2018) randomly
sample a pixel from an image and then replace it with
another pixel randomly sampled from the former’s neigh-
borhood. Discrete wavelet transform is also employed to
filter out adversarial perturbations to the input.
• GUIDED DENOISER. Liao et al. (2018) use a denoising
network architecture to estimate the additive adversarial
perturbation to an input.
• Random self-ensemble (RSE). Liu et al. (2018) com-
bine the ideas of randomness and ensemble using the
same underlying neural network. Given an input, it gener-
ates an ensemble of predictions by adding distinct noises
to the network multiple times.
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Table 2. Average run time to find an adversarial example (NATTACK-R stands forNATTACK initialized with the regression net).
Defense Dataset BPDA NATTACK NATTACK-R(Athalye et al., 2018)
SAP CIFAR-10 (L∞) 33.3s 29.4s –(Dhillon et al., 2018)
RANDOMIZATION ImageNet (L∞) 3.51s 70.77s 48.22s(Xie et al., 2018)
B. Architecture of the Regression Network
We construct our regression neural network by using the
fully convolutional network (FCN) architecture (Shelhamer
et al., 2016). In particular, we adapt the FCN model pre-
trained on PASCAL VOC segmentation challenge (Evering-
ham et al., 2010) to our work by changing its last two layers,
such that the network outputs an adversarial perturbation
of the size 32 × 32 × 3. We train this network by a mean
square loss.
C. Run Time Comparison
Compared with the white-box attack approach BPDA (Atha-
lye et al., 2018), NATTACK may take longer time since
BPDA can find the local optimal solution quickly being
guided by the approximate gradients. However, NATTACK
can be executed in parallel in each episode. We leave imple-
ment the parallel version of our algorithm to the future work
and compare its sing-thread version with BPDA below.
We attack 100 samples on one machine with fou TITAN-
XP graphic cards and calculate the average run time for
reaching an adversarial example. As shown in Table 2,
NATTACK can succeed even faster than the white-box
BPDA on CIFAR-10, yet runs slower on ImageNet. The
main reason is that when the image size is as small as CI-
FAR10 (3*32*32), the search space is moderate. However,
the run time could be lengthy for high resolution images
like ImageNet (3*299*299) especially for some hard cases
(we can find the adversarial examples for nearly 90% test
images but it could take about 60 minutes for a hard case).
We use a regression net to approximate a good initializa-
tion of µ0 and we name NATTACK initialized with the
regression net as NATTACK-R. We run NATTACK and
NATTACK-R on ImageNet with the mini-batch size b = 40
. The success rate for NATTACK with random initialization
is 82% and forNATTACK-R is 91.9%, verifying the efficacy
of the regression net. The run time shown in Table 2 is cal-
culated on the images with successful attacks. The results
demonstrate that NATTACK-R can reduce by 22.5s attack
time per image compared with the random initialization.
